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THE REVISION OF CANADIAN LAW ON SECURITIES 
HOLDING THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES: WHO, 
WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW AND WHY 
James Steven Rogers * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I'm delighted to have the opportunity to comment on the 
legislation that has recently been adopted in Ontario and Alberta 
to revise Canadian law in a fashion consistent with the changes that 
were made in U.S. law by Revised Article 8 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (vcc). I I will concentrate on some of the new 
terminology and concepts used in the Securities Transfer Act (STA~2 
and related revisions of the Personal Property Security Act (PPSA). 
The old newspaper device of "who, what, when, where, how, why" 
provides a useful tool for a survey of the approach taken by the new 
STA to the commercial law of the modern indirect holding system. 
II. WHO 
The indirect holding system provisions of Part VI of the STA apply 
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other financial asset through a securities account maintained by a 
"securities intermediary".4 The arrangement that first comes to mind 
is that of the retail investor who holds securities through an account 
with a brokerage firm. But the indirect holding systems provisions 
apply more broadly. For example, in many circumstances an investor 
holds securities through an account not with a brokerage firm, but 
with a bank acting as a securities custodian. Moreover, the 
commercial law rules in the STA can apply to transactions that may 
be rather different from those that first come to mind. 
Let me begin with a story about the activities of a fraudster named 
James Doyle, whose activities came to light in litigation in the United 
States in the late 1970s.5 Apparently Doyle had once worked for a 
licensed and regulated securities firm, but was fired from that job. 
Fortunately for Doyle, and unfortunately for his customers, a fair 
number of his customers remained loyal to Doyle and continued to 
transact business through him. Doyle's method of operation was very 
simple. Doyle would purchase certificated bearer bonds and hold 
them on behalf of his customers. His accounting and custody system 
was very simple. He would place a particular bond in an envelope and 
write on the outside of the envelope the name of the customer who had 
purchased it. He kept the envelopes containing the bonds in a closet in 
his house. 
Evidently not all went well with Mr. Doyle. He fled the country and 
was apprehended in the Panama Canal Zone. Along with Mr. Doyle, 
the authorities found several suitcases, stuffed with bearer bonds. 
Needless to say, Mr. Doyle had not kept the bonds in the original 
envelopes, nor had he kept any records matching particular bond 
numbers with particular customers. When the authorities searched 
his house, they found some bonds still in his closet, in envelopes 
containing names of some of his customers. The total amount of 
bonds found in the suitcases and closet was, un surprisingly, not 
enough to satisfy the claims of all of Doyle's customers. 
The ensuing litigation pitted the "closet bond" claimants against 
the "suitcase bond" claimants. Those customers whose names were 
written on the outside of envelopes left in the closet, and still 
containing bonds, said "We're sorry about the suitcase bond 
claimants, but our bonds are still there, in their envelopes, marked 
with our names, in the closet. So, we should get our bonds and the rest 
of the unfortunate customers should be left fighting over the division 
of the suitcase bonds." The "suitcase bond" claimants, that is, those 
customers whose names did not appear on any of the envelopes in the 
4. STA, ss. 1(1) and 95. 
5. See United Slates v. Doyle, 486 F. Supp. 1214 (D. Minn. 1980). 
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closet, said "There is no way to reliably distinguish the suitcase bond 
claimants from the closet bond claimants, nor any really good way to 
know whether the people whose names were written on the outside of 
the envelopes in the closet were really the ones whose money paid for 
those bonds. Accordingly, we should all share in all of the bonds." 
I begin with this story partly because it is funny - at least if you 
were not one of the customers. But, more importantly, I mention the 
case because I think that it illustrates, in a very simple way, the 
fundamental problems that the law of modern securities holding 
systems must confront. Doyle was acting as a securities intermediary 
- that is, he was holding a mass of securities on behalf of customers. 
Doyle failed, leaving a shortfall in the securities that he held to satisfy 
the claims of his customers. The legal system had to decide what rules 
it would apply to determine how the loss would be spread among 
Doyle's customers. That is one of the fundamental problems 
addressed by the new Securities Transfer Act. 
The traditional approach to the commercial law of securities 
holding attempted to ignore the role of securities intermediaries and 
describe the interest of a person who held securities through an 
account with an intermediary using essentially the same concepts that 
were developed for the older system in which the ultimate investors 
held physical possession of certificates representing their interests. 
The role of intermediaries was treated under concepts of trust, 
agency, bailment or the like. The main feature of the new STA is that it 
provides a new way of describing the interests of investors who hold 
through intermediaries, taking account of the realities of the modern 
securities holding system. So, the most obvious applications of the 
indirect holding system provisions of the STA are situations where 
investors hold interests in securities through accounts with brokers or 
banks acting as securities custodians. 
But the indirect holding system rules also apply to other stages of 
the tiered system of securities holding that is common today. Suppose 
that Investor holds securities through an account with Broker. The 
STA provides that Investor's interest is described as a "security 
entitlement" with respect to the underlying securities. That security 
entitlement consists of a package of rights against Broker and 
interests in the property held by Broker. It is possible, though 
unlikely, that Broker will itself be a direct holder of the underlying 
securities, for example if Broker has actual physical possession of 
bearer certificates representing the securities. It is far more likely that 
Broker in turn holds through an account with another intermediary. 
In the simplest such arrangement, Broker may have an account with a 
clearing corporation, such as The Canadian Depository for Securities 
52 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 45 
Limited (CDS). The relationship between Broker and CDS is described 
using the same terms and concepts as the relationship between 
Investor and Broker. Broker has a security entitlement against CDS to 
the aggregate position in the underlying security. That security 
entitlement consists of a package of rights that Broker has against CDS 
and interests in the property held by CDS. 
The entities that first come to mind when one thinks of securities 
intermediaries are all heavily regulated financial institutions. But the 
situation that is most likely to present serious problems for the 
commercial law of securities holding occurs if a person who acts as a 
securities intermediary does not comply with the regulatory law. 
Think about Doyle. If Doyle had been honest, it would make no 
difference what legal rules described the interests of customers who 
held through an intermediary. The rule could be as silly as "The 
customers' claims to the securities held by the intermediary are 
ranked in alphabetical order of the customers' last names." That 
would be fine. If there are sufficient securities to satisfy the claims of 
all customers, it does not really matter what rules apply to contests 
among the claimants. The time when the rules really matter is the time 
when there is a conflict among the customers. And the simplest way 
that such a conflict would arise is ifthe person acting as intermediary 
is dishonest and flaunts the regulatory system. 
Note another point illustrated by the Doyle story. One of the 
problems was that Doyle did not keep adequate records.6 There is a 
tendency to assume that the answer to the problem of inadequate 
records is regulation; that is, adopt laws requiring intermediaries to 
keep proper records, and put in place an enforcement mechanism that 
tries to assure that the record-keeping requirements are met, by such 
devices as periodic or surprise audits. Having such regulatory regimes 
is, without question, a very good idea. Indeed, from a practical 
standpoint it is probably the most important role for law and 
governmental institutions in controlling risk in the securities holding 
system. But the adequacy of the regulatory system is a completely 
different issue from the adequacy of the commercial law regime. We 
can put in place regulatory regimes that say, "Intermediaries, you 
must keep good records." We can put in place enforcement rules that 
say, "If the intermediary does not keep good records, then the 
responsible officials of the intermediary will be sent to jail." But no 
amount of regulatory law will resolve the problems that are left by 
intermediaries who do not comply with those laws. If our commercial 
6. Even if Doyle had kept fuller records showing which bonds belonged to which 
customers, it is far from clear that it would have made sense to allocate the 
remaining securities on the basis of those records. 
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law rules work only if the intermediary has kept proper records, then 
our commercial law rules have simply not answered the question. To 
put it simply, regulatory law says "Thou shalt not steal." Commercial 
law tells us what happens to the victims of those who do steal. A 
commercial law that applies only to people who do not steal is not 
very useful. 
The fact that people who violate regulatory law are the most likely 
to create problems requiring a commercial law solution has 
important implications for issues of the scope of the indirect 
holding system rules. When one writes rules for the indirect holding 
system, one naturally has in mind the activities of regulated 
intermediaries. There is a tendency to allow that natural focus to 
shift into a statement of the coverage of the indirect holding system 
rules. Yet if one writes a system of commercial law rules for the 
indirect holding system and ties the coverage of those rules to the 
regulatory law that determines who is permitted to act as a securities 
intermediary, one would have failed to deal with the most important 
problem -what to do if the entity that has failed did not comply with 
regulatory requirements. As a result, the U.S. and Canadian 
processes ended up with a structure of indirect holding system rules 
that applies to any entity that is in fact engaged in the business of 
maintaining securities accounts for others, whether or not it is 
permitted to do so by regulatory law and whether or not it has 
complied with regulatory responsibilities. Thus, if Mr. Doyle's 
activities occurred in the United States or Canada today, the rights of 
his customers would be governed by the indirect holding system rules 
in revised uee Article 8 or the STA, regardless of the fact that he was 
not operating as a properly regulated securities intermediary. 
III. WHAT 
The indirect holding system provisions of the STA apply to an~ 
situation in which a person holds an interest in a "financial asset" 
through a securi ties account main tained by a securi ties in termediary. 
The definitional structure here is, regrettably, a bit complex. The term 
"security"S is used to refer to the narrowest class of instruments that 
have traditionally been the subject of securities transfer law, such as 
shares of stock and bonds. The direct holding system provisions of the 
STA describe the rights and duties of issuers and holders of "securities" 
as well as the process of transfer of directly held interests in securities. 9 
7. STA. s.I(1). 
8. Ibid. 
9. STA, Parts III to V. 
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The definitional structure would be a bit simpler if one said that the 
new indirect holding system rules applied only to the same category of 
investment vehicles as the traditional direct holding system rules -
that is "securities". But that approach would present serious 
problems. 
Consider, for example, bankers' acceptances. In the securities 
business, bankers' acceptances would be thought of as merely one 
category of short-term money market instruments, along with 
commercial paper and certificates of deposit. For purposes of 
commercial law, however, a bankers' acceptance would be regarded 
as a bill of exchange, governed by the Bills of Exchange Act, rather 
than as a security. 10 That is an entirely appropriate classification, 
even for those bankers' acceptances that are handled as investment 
media in the securities markets, because the STA, unlike the Bills of 
Exchange Act, does not contain rules specifying the standardized 
obligations of parties to instruments. For example, Bills of Exchange 
Act rules on the obligations of acceptors and drawers of drafts are 
necessary to specify the obligations represented by bankers' 
acceptances, but the STA contains no provisions dealing with these 
Issues. 
Immobilization through a depository system is, however, just as 
important for money market instruments as for traditional securities. 
If the indirect holding system rules applied only to the narrower 
category of "securities", then they would be of no use for a system in 
which bankers' acceptances are held through a depositary system. 
The STA solves that problem by using the broader term "financial 
asset" in setting the scope of the indirect holding system rules. Thus, 
even though a bankers' acceptance is itself a bill of exchange rather 
than a "security", it would still fall within the definition of "financial 
asset". Accordingly, if the instrument is held through a clearing 
corporation or other securities intermediary, the indirect holding 
system rules of the ST A apply. II 
Indeed, the term "financial asset" that sets the scope of the indirect 
holding system rules is intentionally left very broad. It covers "any 
property that is held by a securities intermediary for another person in 
a securities account if the securi ties intermediary has expressly agreed 
with the other person that the property is to be treated as a financial 
10. See Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 53(2). 
II. STA s. 13 makes this explicit: "A bill of exchange or promissory note to which the 
Bills of Exchange Act (Canada) applies is not a security, but is a financial asset if 
it is held in a securities account." For general discussion of the difference between 
the terms "security" and "financial asset", see Rogers, Hawkland Series, supra, 
footnote I, at [Rev] § 8- 102:04. 
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asset under this Act".12 This provision captures a thought that only 
became apparent after considerable work on the uee Article 8 
revision project - that the rules of the indirect holding system were 
rules about how property is held, not what that property is. In the quip 
that became part of the folklore of the uee Article 8 revision project, 
the indirect holding system rules could just as well apply to a banana 
as to a bond. If a clearing corporation or other intermediary wishes to 
hold bananas for its customers in a securities account and is willing to 
treat its customers as having the same package of rights with respect 
to those bananas as with respect to traditional securities held in the 
account, so be it. There is no reason to make it impossible for the 
parties to use the same package of indirect holding system rules for 
security entitlements with respect to bananas as for security 
entitlements with respect to shares of Microsoft common stock. 
To take a somewhat more realistic example, suppose that 
Canadian Investor wishes to hold a position in an equity security 
issued by French Company through an account with Canadian 
Broker. Canadian Clearing Corporation has made the necessary 
arrangements to hold the equity security through whatever system is 
in place for such investments in France, and therefore Canadian 
Clearing Corporation is willing to hold the position for its customers, 
such as Canadian Broker. Canadian Broker in turn is willing to hold 
the position for Canadian Investor. If the scope of the Canadian 
domestic law of securities holding were limited to "securities", then 
one could not conclude that the Canadian STA provisions concerning 
security entitlements applied unless one could conclude that the 
underlying equity security issued by French Company fit within the 
definition of "security" set out in Canadian law. But it is quite 
possible that differences between the domestic law of France and 
Canada would make it extremely difficult to decide whether the 
French equity interest does or does not fall within the definition of 
"security" set out in Canadian law. Under the definitional structure 
used in the STA, there is no need to ask or answer that question. The 
French equity probably falls within the Canadian definition of 
"financial asset" even without any special action, 13 and even ifthere is 
doubt on that score, the problem can be resolved by an agreement or 
rules of the clearing corporation providing that the interest is to be 
treated as a "financial asset". 14 
12. STA, s. 1(1). 
13. See STA, s. 1(1): '''financial asset' means ... a share, participation or other interest 
in a person, or in property or an enterprise of a person, ... (c) that, (i) is, or is of a 
type, dealt in or traded on financial markets, or (ii) is recognized in any other 
market or area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment." 
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A final definitional complexity affects the coverage of the new 
security interest rules. The new security interest rules apply to 
"investment property" Y That term includes both "securities" and 
"security entitlements", so it covers both any direct interest in a 
traditional security as well as any "security entitlement" to the 
broader category of "financial asset". But, the term "investment 
property" also includes a "futures contract" or "futures account". 
The idea here is that the needs of the commercial law regime for the 
description of the rights of investors in commodity futures 
arrangements may be different from the needs of the commercial 
law regime for investors in securities. On the other hand, the new 
secured transaction rules are appropriate for futures. Thus, the STA 
definitional scheme explicitly excludes commodity contracts from 
the scope of both the term "security" and the term "financial asset" .16 
Accordingly, the STA itself does not apply either to the analysis of the 
obligations of the parties to a commodity contract itself, or to the 
relationships between commodity customers and commodity 
brokers or between commodity brokers and commodity clearing 
entities. If, however, the customer wished to use a position in a 
commodity contract or commodity account as collateral in a secured 
transaction, the new secured transaction rules will apply, because the 
secured transaction rules apply to "investment property". 
IV. WHEN 
It is common for newly enacted statutes to provide that the new law 
does not apply to transactions or events that took place before the 
statute became effective. The STA takes a different approach to 
transition issues. No one, of course, would dispute the general 
proposition that a legislative act should not retroactively disrupt 
legitimate settled expectations. One cannot, however, decide how 
that general principle applies to a particular proposed legislative act 
without carefully analyzing whether application of the act would 
14. See STA, s. 1(1): '''financial asset' means ... (d) any property that is held by a 
securities intermediary for another person in a securities account if the securities 
intermediary has expressly agreed with the other person that the property is to be 
treated as a financial asset under this Act."; STA, s. 7(1): "A rule adopted by a 
clearing agency governing rights and obligations between the clearing agency and 
its participants or between participants in the clearing agency is effective even if 
the rule conflicts with this Act or the Personal Property Security Act and affects 
another person who does not consent to the rule." 
15. PPSA, s. 1(1): "'investment property' means a security, whether certificated or 
uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, futures contract or futures 
account". 
16. STA, s. 16(1). 
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disrupt legitimate settled expectations. If the effect of the new 
enactment is to change rules from one settled state to a different 
settled state, fairly elaborate transition rules may be needed to 
preserve the effect of transactions effected under old law. By contrast, 
if a statutory enactment is designed primarily to foreclose the 
possibility of unfortunate consequences that might follow from 
unfortunate interpretations of prior law, it is hard to see what 
objection there could be to giving full retroactive application to the 
new law. The point of the STA project is not to change the ultimate 
outcome of potential disputes, but to eliminate uncertainties that 
might stand in the way of reaching a sensible result. It is a bit hard to 
see how anyone can claim to have a legitimate reliance interest in 
uncertainty. 
Accordingly, Section 9 of the STA provides simply that the act 
"does not affect a legal proceeding that was commenced before this 
section came into force". The point is only to avoid disruption of 
ongoing litigation by having the law governing a given lawsuit change 
while that suit is pending. But, aside from that limitation, the STA is 
fully effective and applies to any transactions that occurred before or 
after its effective date. The transition rules for the revision of the 
secured transaction rules are only slightly more complex. They 
provide that if action was taken to perfect a security interest prior to 
the effective date, and that action would suffice for perfection under 
the new law, then no further action is required. 17 The only significant 
transition issue would be presented by the relatively unusual 
circumstance of action that was sufficient for perfection under old 
but not new law. In that case, there is a four-month grace period after 
the revisions become effective to take the necessary action. 18 
V. WHERE 
By its very nature, the modern securities holding system tends to 
transcend political borders. If an investor in Toronto opens an 
account with a brokerage firm that does business exclusively in 
Toronto, or if that investor wishes to pledge all or a portion of its 
securities account to a bank located in Toronto as collateral for a 
loan, one would think that only the law of Ontario need be 
considered. Ironically, however, traditional approaches to conflict 
oflaws make that conclusion relatively unlikely. If one thinks of the 
transaction as the transfer of an interest in the underlying securities, 
then the traditional/ex situs approach to conflicts would lead one to 
17. PPSA, s. 84(2). 
18. PPSA, s. 84(3). 
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conclude that the law governing the transaction is determined by the 
location of the underlying securities. Even in a fairly simple situation, 
that might be difficult to determine. But if the investor holds through 
the account a diversified portfolio of securities issued by companies 
around the world it may be difficult or impossible to decide which 
country's law applies to the transaction. 
Fortunately, the conflict of laws analysis becomes much simpler 
under the STA. Section 45 provides that, in general, the law governing 
a securities entitlement is not determined by the location of the 
underlying securities. Rather, the law governing a securities 
entitlement is determined by the securities intermediary's 
jurisdiction. Moreover, to eliminate possible problems in 
determining that jurisdiction, STA s. 45(2) provides that an 
agreement between the intermediary and customer can settle the 
question. Similarly, the conflict oflaws provisions of the new secured 
transaction rules provide, in general, that the law governing 
perfection of a security interest in a security entitlement is the law 
of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction. 19 
There is, however, a problem that cannot be resolved merely by 
enacting sensible modern conflict rules in Canada. Those rules will 
apply only if the litigation takes place in Canada. If the litigation 
happens to occur elsewhere, a court in that jurisdiction would have no 
choice but to look to its own conflict of laws rules to decide which 
jurisdiction's law applies. So, parties doing a deal must first make 
some educated guesses about the most likely place oflitigation. If the 
result of that analysis is a conclusion that any litigation is likely to 
occur either in a Canadian province that has enacted the STA, or in a 
state of the United States, then the conflicts issues should not be 
complex. If, however, there is a significant likelihood that potential 
litigation might occur in another place, then there really is no simple 
answer to the transactional lawyer's desire to know "which 
jurisdiction's law will apply". Those problems are the subject of a 
proposed international convention, the Hague Convention on the 
Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with 
an Intermediary. 20 
19. PPSA, s. 7.1(2)(c). 
20. See Bradley Crawford, "The Hague 'Prima' Convention: Choice of Law to 
Govern Recognition of Dispositions of Book-Based Securities in Cross Border 
Transactions" (2003), 38 C.B.L.J. 157; James Steven Rogers, "Conflict of Laws 
for Transactions in Securities Held Through Intermediaries" (2006), 39 Cornell 
Int'l L.J. 285. 
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VI. HOW 
The key element of the definitional and coverage structure of the 
STA is the "how" question, that is, how does the entity that might be 
covered by the new indirect holding system rules undertake to treat 
the persons for whose benefit it is acting? As noted above, neither the 
"what" question nor the "who" question plays a critical role in setting 
the scope of the STA. The STA applies to any asset that a securities 
intermediary has undertaken to hold in a securities account, and 
anyone who holds assets in a securities account is a securities 
intermediary. Accordingly the main burden of distinguishing 
situations to which the STA applies from other arrangements falls to 
the "how" question. The significant issue is whether someone (the 
securities intermediary) has agreed to treat something (the financial 
asset) as being held for someone else (the entitlement holder) in a 
"securities account". "Securities account" is the most important 
definitional provision. It plays a role for the indirect holding system 
rules akin to the defined term "security" for the direct holding system 
rules. If one wants to know whether the direct holding system rules 
apply, the first step is to look at the definition of "security". If one 
wants to know whether the indirect holding system rules apply, the 
first step is to look at the definition of "securities account". 
Section 1(1) of the STA provides that 
"securities account" means an account to which a financial asset is or may be 
credited in accordance with an agreement under which the person 
maintaining the account undertakes to treat the person for whom the account 
is maintained as entitled to exercise the rights that constitute the financial 
asset. 
There is an inevitable element of circularity here. If a relationship falls 
within the definition of "securities account", then the intermediary 
and customer have the rights and duties set out in the indirect holding 
system rules in Part VI of the STA. But whether an arrangement does 
or does not fall within the definition of "securities account" depends 
on whether it makes sense to treat the arrangement as one in which the 
intermediary has undertaken to treat the customer as entitled to 
exercise the rights set out in Part VI of the STA. Those who care more 
for abstract conceptual tidiness will find this somewhat distressing. 
But those who see law as a sensible, purposive human undertaking 
will find the approach comfortable. In a sense, all of Part VI of the STA 
is part of the definition of "securities account".21 Thus, to understand 
21. As the comment to the equivalent provision of U.S. law notes, "the question 
whether a given arrangement is a securities account should be decided not by 
dictionary analysis of the words of the definition taken out of context, but by 
60 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 45 
both the definition of "securities account" and the basic approach 
that the STA takes to articulating the rights and duties of securities 
intermediaries and account holders, we need to survey the 
substantive provisions set out in Part VI of the STA. 
Section 95 of the STA sets out the basic rule that a person acquires a 
security entitlement "if a securities intermediary ... indicates by book 
entry that a financial asset has been credited to the person's securities 
account". Though it may not be immediately obvious, this represents 
a significant change from the approach taken under prior law. Under 
prior law, the way that a person acquired an interest in a security, 
other than upon original issue, was by "transfer". As prior law stated, 
"upon delivery of a security, the purchaser acquires the rights in the 
security that the transferor had ... ".22 As applied to simple, off-
market transactions in which an identified person sells a security to 
another identified person, that conceptual structure is workable. But 
- though this is a point that lawyers have been overlooking for a long 
time - that conceptual approach makes no sense as applied to the 
real world. In a typical market transaction, the buyer of a security 
through a broker has no idea who the seller is. Moreover, if we are 
analyzing the acquisition of property interests, the focus should not 
be the contract for sale that is entered into by the parties' brokers as 
agents for undisclosed principals, but the actual performance of the 
contract, that is, the process of settlement of trades. In the settlement 
system for modern securities trading, trades are commonly settled on 
a net basis among brokers. In that case, it will frequently be 
impossible to identify any movement of securities from a particular 
seller to a particular buyer.23 
Section 95 of the STA takes a completely different approach to the 
acquisition of an interest in securities in the indirect holding system. A 
buyer's acquisition of a property interest does not depend on any 
concept of "trans fer" from someone else. Rather, the buyer acquires a 
security entitlement when the intermediary credits the position to the 
buyer's account. At that moment, the buyer has the property interest 
-known asa "security entitlement" -that is described by Part VIof 
the STA. 
Section 96 ofthe STA provides that "a legal proceeding based on an 
adverse claim to a financial asset, however framed, may not be 
brought against a person who acquires a security entitlement under 
section 95 for value and without notice of the adverse claim". One 
considering whether it promotes the objectives of Article 8 to include the 
arrangement within the term securities account." vee § 8-501 cmt I. 
22. Ontario Business Corporations Act, supra, footnote 10, s. 69(1). 
23. See Rogers, supra, footnote 20, at pp. 318-27. 
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might think of this rule as "son ofbfp". It plays a role for the indirect 
holding system analogous to the role played by traditional adverse 
claim cut-off rules in the direct holding system. The difference is that 
the rule is not stated in terms of the buyer taking free from adverse 
claims, because it is really not accurate to say that a buyer has the 
"same thing" that used to belong to someone else. But, even if 
someone were able to assert a claim, based on equitable tracing 
notions or whatever, to the property in the hands of the buyer, the 
buyer would be protected against any such adverse claim by the rule 
ofs.96. 
Section 97 of the STA establishes the important point that a security 
entitlement is a form of property interest. In the drafting of vee 
Revised Article 8 in the United States, a great deal of attention was 
devoted to considering how lawyers who were not familiar with the 
new law, or lawyers from other legal systems, would understand the 
redescription of the rights of investors who hold through 
intermediaries. Several of the early drafts avoided explicit mention 
of the concept of "property interest" on the theory that the use of the 
older language might be problematic. It is certainly true that a 
security entitlement is not a property interest in some specific item 
held by the intermediary, of the sort that might be asserted against 
someone else to whom that specific security has been transferred. But 
that does not mean that a security entitlement is not a special form of 
property interest. For example, it would be completely inconsistent 
with the general understanding of the relationship between a 
securities firm or custodian and its customers to treat the customers 
as having merely a contractual claim against the intermediary. One 
possibility would have been to avoid altogether any attempt to 
categorize a security entitlement as a "property interest" or as some 
other form oflegal right. However, many lawyers who were involved 
in the project warned that lawyers from other legal systems would be 
confused if it were not possible to provide a simple answer to the 
question "Is a security entitlement a property interest?" In response 
to those concerns the language used in the statute was changed to 
make it possible to provide a simple, unambiguous answer to exactly 
that question. The answer is "Yes. A security entitlement is a property 
interest." The text makes this point absolutely clear. 
"Security Entitlement" is defined in STA, s. 1(1) as "the rights and 
property interest of an entitlement holder with respect to a financial 
asset that are specified in Part VI". Turning from the definition to the 
substantive provisions describing a security entitlement, the key 
provision is STA s. 97, entitled "Property interest of entitlement 
holders in financial asset." That provision begins in subsection (1) by 
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stating that to the extent needed to satisfy the claims of all of its 
entitlement holders having security entitlements to a certain financial 
asset, 
all interests in that financial asset held by the securities intermediary, 
(a) are held by the securities intermediary for the entitlement holders; 
(b) are not the property of the securities intermediary; and 
(c) are not subject to claims of creditors of the securities intermediary, except 
as otherwise provided in section 105. 
The remainder of ST A s. 97 explains in more detail the precise 
incidents of the entitlement holder's property interest. So long as the 
intermediary remains solvent, or, even if insolvent, has sufficient 
securities to satisfy the claims of customers to a particular security, 
the entitlement holder's property interest can be enforced only by 
exercise against the intermediary of the rights described in more detail 
in STA ss. 99-102. However, if the intermediary is insolvent, it is 
possible for the entitlement holder's property interest to be asserted 
against other parties. That property interest, however, can not be 
asserted against any purchaser who gave value, obtained control, and 
did not act in collusion with the intermediary in violating the 
intermediary'S obligations to its entitlement holders?4 
STA ss. 98-102 can be thought of as a thumbnail sketch of the rights 
that we assume that a customer has against a brokerage firm or 
securities custodian who holds a securities position on behalf of the 
customer. Thus, these sections describe the package of rights that 
make up a security entitlement. Section 98 provides that the 
intermediary has a duty to obtain and maintain financial assets 
sufficient to satisfy all of its customer's security entitlements. 
Section 99 provides that the intermediary has a duty to obtain and 
turn over to the entitlement holder any dividends or other 
distributions that are made by the issuer. Section 100 provides that 
the intermediary shall exercise any rights with respect to a financial 
asset, such as voting rights, in the fashion directed by the entitlement 
holder. Section 101 provides that the intermediary shall comply with 
entitlement orders originated by the entitlement holder, such as an 
order to transfer the position to someone else upon a sale. Section 102 
provides that the intermediary shall follow the entitlement holder's 
instructions to convert the holding to any other form of securities 
holding for which the entitlement holder is eligible. For example, if 
the issuer will issue certificates or otherwise directly record ownership 
on its books, the intermediary shall follow the directions of its 
customer if the customer wishes to convert to that form of holding. 
24. STA, 55. 97(4) and (7). 
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If one were pressed for precise details of exactly how an 
intermediary should carry out the duties stated in ss. 98-102, or 
asked whether there might be any circumstances that would warrant 
some form of exception or qualification to the duties stated in those 
sections, one would quickly realize that a complete answer would 
require an extensive treatise on the law concerning the rights and 
duties of securities firms and their customers. Moreover, that 
relationship is typically the subject of detailed regulation. The idea 
of ss. 98-102 is not to provide a comprehensive answer to all such 
questions. Rather, the idea is to highlight the key features that 
identify the securities intermediary-entitlement holder relationship 
and distinguish it from other relationships. Accordingly, the 
articulation of duties in ss. 98-102 is subject to two other principles. 
First, the sections stating specific duties of an intermediary all state 
that the intermediary satisfies that duty ifit acts in accordance with an 
agreement between it and the entitlement holder, or, in the absence of 
an agreement, if the intermediary exercises due care in accordance 
with reasonable commercial standards. Second, s. 103 provides that if 
another law or regulation provides details on the performance of the 
duty in question, then compliance with that other law constitutes 
compliance with the duty as articulated in the STA. 
One way to see how the substantive provisions in Part VI ofthe STA 
function in tandem with the definition of "securities account" is to 
consider how the relationship between a securities intermediary and 
its entitlement holder differs from a variety of other relationships. 
For example, consider the relationship between an investor and a 
mutual fund. The mutual fund is holding a portfolio of securities for 
the benefit of its shareholders. Similarly, one could describe a 
securities intermediary as holding a portfolio of securities for the 
benefit of its entitlement holders. But the relationship is very 
different. Suppose that a shareholder of a mutual fund calls up the 
fund manager and says "I don't think you should invest in Acme Inc. I 
think you should sell Acme Inc. and buy Beta Inc." The appropriate 
response from the fund manager is something along the lines of 
"That's interesting, but irrelevant. If you don't like my management, 
don't invest in the fund." By contrast, suppose that an entitlement 
holder holds shares of Acme Inc. through a securities account with a 
securities intermediary. If the entitlement holder directs the 
intermediary to sell Acme and buy Beta, the intermediary will do 
so. Part of what it means to be a securities intermediary operating a 
securities account for an entitlement holder is that, as STA s. 101 
provides, "a securities intermediary shall comply with an entitlement 
order" originated by its entitlement holder. 
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To take another example, consider the relationship between a 
trustee and beneficiary in a situation where the trust corpus is invested 
in a portfolio of securities. The trustee is holding a portfolio of 
securities for the benefit of the trust beneficiary. So too, a securities 
intermediary is holding a portfolio of securities for the benefit of its 
entitlement holders. But again, the relationships are very different. In 
the trust arrangement, the beneficiary has no right to give directions 
to the trustee about what securities to hold. By contrast, that is an 
essential part of the relationship between a securities intermediary 
and its entitlement holder. 
VII. WHY 
So why should Canada or any other nation undertake the project 
of revising the commercial law of securities holding? The commercial 
law rules of the securities holding and transfer system are a bit like the 
utility systems of a building. When they are working right, no one 
notices them. As they age, it takes more and more effort to keep them 
working and they may break down altogether under heavy load. At 
some point prudence demands that they be replaced with modern 
systems, even though they are still "working". By the late twentieth 
century, an inordinate amount of legal time - which, of course, 
means cost - was required to fit modern securities transactions into 
the conceptual scheme of a prior era. Moreover, the poor fit between 
law and practice means that legal advisors are unlikely to be able to 
provide quick and certain answers when they are most needed. 
The STA establishes clear legal rules designed specifically for 
modern securities holding practices. Understanding the new law will, 
of course, require some expenditure oftime and effort by lawyers and 
business people. However, once one undertakes that process, I think 
that one will see that the new law does not so much change the law as 
reformulate the language of the law to bring it into compliance with 
developments in the marketplace. 
Consider, for example, one of the issues that prompted some 
discussion in the United States project, that is, the rule on potential 
disputes between secured creditors and customers of a securities firm 
that fails leaving a shortfall in the securities needed to satisfy all 
claims. Under STA s. 105, the customers of a failed firm have priority, 
unless the secured creditor has obtained "control". When one first 
hears of the issue, many people are likely to think that the rule should 
be that customers always beat secured creditors. I confess that was my 
initial reaction. 25 But once one thinks through the issue carefully, one 
25. See Rogers, "Policy Perspectives", supra, footnote I, at p. 1512. 
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sees that the initial reaction is misguided. In the first place, the only 
change made by s. 105 is to state with a bit more clarity an outcome 
that has been the law for centuries. Suppose that a securities firm has 
physical possession of bearer bonds that it is holding for its 
customers. The firm wrongfully pledges them to a lender who takes 
possession. The firm fails. Can the customers recover the bonds from 
the firm's secured creditor? Clearly not. The secured creditor can 
qualify as a "bona fide purchaser" who takes free from adverse 
claims. That has been true for ages. The main thing that s. 105 does is 
state that principle in modern language. Should that rule have been 
changed? It is hard to see why. For one thing, drawing the line 
between "secured creditors" and "customers" is not as easy as it first 
seems. One of the ways that securities firms obtain financing is by 
repurchase agreements. Among the main sources of repo financing 
are money market mutual funds. So, if one really wanted to say that 
"customers" have priority over "lenders", then one would end up 
saying that the loss should be shifted from the customers of the failed 
firm to the shareholders of a money market mutual fund that did repo 
transactions with it?6 A key concern in the modern securities 
clearance and settlement system is the control of systemic risk - that 
is, the risk that a failure of one securities firm might cause others to 
fail. In the United States, government agencies that oversee the 
securities markets became particularly concerned with these issues 
after the October 1987 stock market break indicated that uncertainty 
concerning the application of the old Article 8 rules to modern 
securities transactions adversely affected liquidity and placed 
significant stress on the securities clearance and settlement system. 
As one knowledgeable observer remarked, "That's an interesting 
question" is not an acceptable answer to questions about the legal 
rights of securities firms and their lenders in times when the prospect 
of the collapse of the financial system is a matter of more than 
theoretical concern. Commercial law cannot itself provide adequate 
protections to customers of securities firms. That is a matter for 
regulatory law and, in the event that failures occur, for insurance and 
bankruptcy law. Even if there were inadequacies in the other law that 
protects investors in the indirect holding system, there is nothing that 
commercial law rules can do about the risk that an intermediary 
might not have the securities. What led to revision of Article 8 in the 
United States was not intermediary risk itself, that is, the risk that 
customers of a failed intermediary might suffer loss, but systemic risk, 
that is, the risk that a failure of one securities firm might cause others 
26. Ibid., at pp. 1527-28. 
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to fail. Commercial law can not protect against the failure of one's 
own intermediary; it can help protect against the risk that an investor 
will suffer as a result of the failure of someone else's intermediary. 
